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This paper tests several theories of the effects of congressional representation on state
economic growth. States that were represented by very senior Democratic congressmen grew
more quickly during the 1953-1990 period than states that were represented by more junior
congressional delegations. We find some, but weaker, evidence that states with a high fraction
of their delegation on particularly influential committees also exhibit above-average growth. We
also test partisan models of distributive politics by studying the relationship between a state's
degree of political competition and its growth rate. Our findings support both nonpartisan and
partisan models of congressional distributive politics. In spite of our findings with respect to
economic growth, we can not detect any substantively important association between
congressional delegation seniority, the degree of state political competition, and the geographic
distribution of federal funds. The source of the growth relationships we identify therefore
remains an open question.
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and NBERRoberts (1990) found that when Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, died unexpectedly in September
1983, the stock market values of defense contractors based in his home state of
Washington declined. The share prices of contractors based in Georgia, the home
state of the next-most-senior Democratic Senator on the committee, Sam Nunn,
increased. When Senator George Mitchell of Maine announced his plan to retire from
the Senate at the end of his current term, the New York Times reported that "the
most agonizing part of his decision ... was recognizing that his position enabled him
to help his home state in ways that a freshman taking his place could not." (March
6, 1994, p.11)
This "event study" and testimonial evidence is only a small part of a vast
empirical literature that has examined the link between Congressional representation
and the distribution of government-controlled economic benefits. There is ample
anecdotal evidence that some senior congressmen have represented districts with
disproportionate shares of some types of federal spending. Pearson and Anderson
(1968) provide a particularly compelling account of former congressman Mendel
Rivers ("Rivers Delivers") of South Carolina, who chaired the House Armed Services
Committee, and his efforts to channel military spending to his district. Yet systematic
empirical studies of committee membership and the distribution of spending, such as
Goss (1972), Ray (1980, 1981), Ritt (1976), Rundquist (1978), and Rundquist and
Griffiths (1976), or congressional seniority and the distribution of spending, such as
Greene and Munley (1980) and Kiel and McKenzie (1983), yield weak evidence on the
impact of representation on the distribution of expenditures.2
At least three conceptual difficulties plague empirical efforts to link
representation and the distribution of policy outcomes. First, representatives from
districts with particular interests will be attracted to committees with control over
district-relevant issues. Finding that farm state legislators are more likey to serve on
the Agriculture Committee, and that their districts receive above-average levels of
spending in farm support programs, is hardly evidence of a causal link between
committee membership and the allocation of spending. Second, the complex
institutional structure of Congress, and the possibility of log-rolling and other types
of coalition formation, make It difficult to identify influential members. Senior
representatives who are not affiliated with a particular committee may influence
legislative outcomes within the committee's Jurisdiction by promising actions in other
legislative spheres. Finally, recent work such as Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) and
Cox and McCubbins (1993) highlights the role of political parties in Congress, and
suggests the rational self-interest of Individual legislators may be served by furthering
the party's fortunes, even when that comes at some expense to their own district.
Our research differs from previous empirical studies of distributive politics in
two important ways. First, we analyze the effects of political institutions on an
economic outcome, the growth rate in state per capita personal income, as well as on
an intermediate Input," the allocation of federal spending. Our approach recognizes
the possibility that legislators affect constituent welfare in many ways besides the
direct allocation of federal spending, for example by promoting regulatory and tax
policies that are favorable to district interests. One disadvantage of studying overall3
economic growth is that congressional structure may account for a relatively small
share of its variation across jurisdictions.
A second innovation is our test of whether congressional party objectives affect
the distribution of economic growth. We argue that if party members are interested
in both their own re-election probabilities and the probability that their party will
control a majority of legislative seats, then the collective interest of party members
may require channelling higher-than-average resources to districts where the party's
electoral majority is least certain. We try to identify these districts, which tend not
to be represented by senior congressmen, and then to compare their growth rates to
those of "safe one-party districts.This interpretation of the objectives of
congressional parties yields empirical predictions that are distinct from the predictions
of models based on the district representative's committee power or seniority alone.
This paper is divided into seven sections. The first summarizes both
nonpartisan and partisan models of congressional distributive politics. We focus on
three classes of models: those that emphasize congressional seniority oer Se, those
that emphasize membership on particular committees, and those that emphasize the
objectives of congressional political parties. Section two describes the data that form
the basis for our state-by-state analysis of congressional delegation composition, state
political competitiveness, and economic growth In the 1953-1990 period.
The third section presents our empirical results. We find that states with a
higher fraction of very senior Democratic representatives in their delegation experience
faster per capita income growth than states with less senior delegations. We do not4
find such a pattern for senior senators. We find weak evidence that states with
members on particularly influential House committees experience more rapid growth.
The strongest correlation we find is between states in which the two major political
parties are competitive, measured either based on congressional or presidential vote
shares, and state economic growth. •More competitive states exhibit faster growth.
Section four illustrates our empirical results by contrasting actual state growth rates
with our estimates of what growth rates would have been assuming that all states
had average political characteristics.
The fifth section considers the interpretation of the correlations we observe.
We evaluate, and find little support for, the possibility that more rapid economic
growth leads to significantly better re-election prospects for incumbent congressmen,
hence to more senior delegations or greater representation on key committees. The
direction of causality is less clear in the case of political competitiveness. Section six
tests the hypothesis that seniority, committee membership, and the degree of political
competition affect state growth through the geographic distribution of federal
spending. We find no consistent association between spending patterns and the
political variables that are correlated with economic growth. Although it is possible
the influential representatives affect policies other than spending, such as regulation,
that affect economic growth, we do not yet have a convincing interpretation of what
explains the correlation between political variables and economic growth. A brief
concluding section suggests several directions for further investigation.5
1. Distributive Politics and Congressional Institutions
The first set of studies that adopted the rational choice perspective to study
Congress maintained that legislators attempt to maximize their chances of re-election
by maximizing the policy benefits that they delivered to their constituents.' This
literature recognized that the amount of influence over particular federal policies varies
widely across legislators, as a function of committee position or seniority rank. It did
not, however, attempt to explain the origins of such institutions, or to understand the
process by which different legislators were assigned to different committees.
Nevertheless, it provided the theoretical underpinning for a substantial empirical
literature that tested for geographic patterns in the distribution of federal spending,
and tried to relate these patterns to congressional committee assignments.
One of the difficulties with this simple analysis of the distribution of economic
spoils Is explaining how small majorities of congressmen can pursue programs that
benefit their constituents at the expense of others. Weingast (1979) developed the
notion of "universalism" to explain how some legislation with highly localized benefits,
such as rivers and harbors bills, could pass with near-unanimity. Universalism argues
that it is in the rational self-interest of all congressmen to participate in a unanimous
coalition sponsoring such legislation, rather than to try to be part of a smaller majority
with a more narrow distribution of benefits. Universalism suggests a much richer
relationship between an individual representative's committee assignment and policy
'Shepsie and Weingast (1994) survey more than two decades of research that
applies the rational choice perspective to Congress.6
outcomes than the simple models described above, but as Weingast (1994) argues,
In practice it has proven difficult to identify and test such relationships.2
We test two hypotheses about the role of committees about the allocation of
government-controlled economic benefits. The first, which we label the "seniority
hypothesis," predicts that more senior legislators, who are more likely to control
influential committee posts and other positions of influence in their party leadership,
should be able to channel greater economic benefits to their constituents. We
distinguish this from a second hypothesis, the "committee hypothesis," which argues
that influential committee members, and not senior members oer Se, should be able
to channel benefits to their constituents. The two hypotheses differ because the
seniority hypothesis allows for legislative bargaining of the type described in Fiorina
(1981), which may enable senior members to achieve favorable policy outcomes, even
if they do not serve on key committees with direct policy control.
A substantial body of recent research on Congress has concentrated on
explaining its "industrial organization" and providing a positive explanation for
particular institutions. Weingast and Marshall (1988) and Krehbiel (1991) illustrate
this research program. In addition, a number of studies, such as Cox and McCubbins
(1993), Rohde (1991), and Snyder (1993), have called attention to the potential
importance of political parties, rather than individual legislators or the set of all
legislators In the chamber, as key decision makers. While data on the geographical
2Krehbiel (1991) presents some evidence calling into question the degree to which
universalism characterizes the approval of pork-barrel legislation. Other recent
attempts to test universalism include Collie (1988) and Stein and Bickers (1993).7
distribution of economic benefits may not be able to differentiate positive theories of
congressional Institutions, such as Gilligan and Krehbiel's (1990) information-based
model, from earlier models that viewed committee assignments and committee
structure as exogenous, it is possible to test partisan models of distributive politics.
A party's influence on policy Is discontinuous in Its share of the elected
representatives; it Increases dramatically if it wins a majority. This can affect the
career prospects of individual party members, who are more likely to win re-election
if their party is in the majority and consequently has greater control over resource
allocation. If legislators in the majority party are concerned with preserving their
majority, and If channelling resources to highly-competitive political jurisdictions is
more likely to result In winning an extra congressional seat than channelling the same
resources to a NsafeM district, then legislators may vote to allocate resources to these
marginal districts.3 These districts are unlikely to overlap with the safe" districts
typically represented by very senior congressmen. Partisan distributive politics models
therefore predict a different allocation of economic rewards than the nonpartisan
distributive politics models described above.
2. Data Construction
This section describes the measures of economic performance, congressional
delegation seniority, committee membership, and political competition that form the
3Wrlght (1974) and Fleck (1993) present empirical evidence that FDA pursued a
related form of distribution toward marginal jurisdictions in allocating the benefits of
New Deal programs.8
basis for our study. We focus on states rather than congressional districts as the
geographic unit of analysis for three reasons. First, there is much more detailed
information on economic conditions at the state than at the district level. The primary
source of economic data on congressional districts, the decennial census, limits the
frequency at which we can observe economic conditions. Redistricting also makes
it impossible to construct a panel data set on economic conditions in congressional
districts.4 Second, some of the benefits from a powerful legislator may "spill over"
to adjacent districts.This would translate into benefits for state economic
performance that are not captured at the district level. Finally, testing the influence
of senators, who represent entire states, requires use of state-level data.
2.1 State Economic Growth
Our primary measure of state economic performance is the growth rate of state
per capita personal income. Although growth has not been used in previous studies
of congressional distributive politics, the link between political institutions and
economic growth has attracted attention, notably from Olson (1982) and Gray and
Lowery (1988). We consider growth rates rather than the level of per capita income
because levels may be affected by many state-specific factors, such as natural
resource endowment or historical Industrial composition, that are not subject to
4lf a congressman boosts economic activity, this may attract new residents to his
district, and lead to a subsequent change in the district boundaries. This raises the
possibility of non-randomness in the set of congressional districts with constant
boundaries across redistricting years.9
legislative control.5 We focus on income rather than an obvious alternative,
employment, because income better captures the value of the economic activity
taking place in a state. One limitation of personal income is that it is gross of taxes
paid to federal, state, and local governments. We have replicated our analysis using
disposable income, which is net of taxes, with results very similar to those reported
below.
Figure 2.1 presents state growth rates during our sample period. The average
rate of growth in real per capita personal income between 1949 and 1990 is 2.1%.
The standard deviation of this growth rate, computed across all states and years, is
3.7%. The figure shows the substantial divergence in growth rates across states, as
well as the broad regional patterns in growth rates. States in the South and the
Northeast grew most quickly during this period, while states in the Midwest and North
Central regions grew slowest. There is substantial variation over time in relative state
growth rates. States in the South experienced the most rapid growth in the first half
of the sample period, while states in the Northeast grew quickly in the later years.
The Midwest and North Central regions of the country experienced slower growth in
both periods.
5Per capita income controls for interstate population movements that could shift
the aggregate level of output in a state. Normalizing by population does, however,
mean that if a successful legislator brings resources to his district, andthese
resources attract migrants who bid down per capita income, we will understatehis
positive effects on economic activity. We discuss this issue further below.10
2.2 Congressional Delegation Seniority and Committee Membership
We develop two sets of measures of the potential influence of a legislator on
growth. The first set is derived from data on congressional seniority, the second set
from Information on committee assigments and committee ranks. We employ a semi-
parametric estimation approach that imposes minimal restrictions on the relationship
between these variables and economic growth. We assign each member of the House
of Representatives (Senate) to one of eleven (seven) seniority categories. For the
House, we define six categories for Democrats and five for Republicans because there
were an average of 81 more Democratic than Republican representatives during our
sample period. Our categories correspond to the top twenty members of each party,
Figure 2.1: State Average Growth Rates, 1953 -1990
Real Per Capita Personal Income
• Oreter Then2.4%
Between 2.1end 2,4%
uJ Between 18 end 2.1%
o Leec Then1.8%11
ranked by seniority, those ranked twenty-one to sixty, sixty-one to one-hundred, etc.
We then construct eleven summary statistics for the seniority of each state's
congressional delegation in each year, corresponding to the fraction of the state's
representatives In each category. For the Senate, we follow an analogous procedure,
defining four categories for Democrats and three for Republicans.
Figure 2.2 shows the average distribution of the 20 most senior House
Democrats across state congressional delegations. The states with the highest
average seniority are concentrated in the South. Mississippi's delegation is the most
senior on average, with over one quarter of its members in the most senior twenty.
Concentration of Top 20 Senior Democrats
Percent of Delegation, 1953-1990
Figure 2.2:
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The next highest state, Texas, averages 17% of its congressmen in the top 20. In
the early part of our sample period, the disparities between. Southern and other states
were even more dramatic than the sample averages suggest. Six states, Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, held 38% of the top 20
positions in the first half of our sample, compared with 22% in the second half. A
higher fraction of the senior House Democrats represent Northern districts during the
second half of the sample.
Figure 2.3 plots the average growth rate of state per capita income over the
Figure 2.3: Average Economic Growth and Concentration of Senior
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1953-1990period against the average fraction of the state's House delegation among
the twenty most senior Democrats. The figure shows a strong positive association13
between these variables (p=.42}. Mississippi, the state with the most senior
Congressional delegation, also exhibits one of the highest state growth rates. Even
excluding Mississippi, the figure shows a strong positive correlation between average
seniority and growth (p=•41)•B
We also compute measures of congressional influence based on committee
assignments and committee rank in the House. We focus on five particularly
influential committees, Agriculture, Appropriations, Armed Services, Public Works, and
Ways and Means. We compute the fraction of the members of each state's House
delegation on these committees, and also calculate the fraction of the delegation
members who are chairs, or ranking minority members, on these five committees.
The pattern of membership on, and chairmanship of, influential committees in the
House is similar to the pattern of seniority. Focusing on state averages for our sample
period, the correlation between top twenty Democrats and committee chairs is .59,
and the correlation between top twenty Democrats and membership on the key
committees is .30.
These measures of committee Influence, while similar to those in many previous
empirical studies of distributive politics, suffer from two potentially serious limitations.
First, they require a somewhat arbitrary determination of which committees are
'This discussion of average state seniority is a somewhat misleading guide to our
subsequent empirical analysis. Many of our equations include state fixed effects,
which control for any association between average state growth rates and average
delegation composition.14
included in the influential set.1 While it Is widely accepted that committee
assignments, chairmanships, and positions in the party leadership affect a
representative's influence, it is difficult to evaluate the position of any individual
representative. Our nonparametric seniority measures, in contrast, recognize that
senior congressmen have some latitude in choosing their committee positions.
Secondly, a congressman's preferences for a committee assignment are affected by
the particular needs and circumstances of his district.8 To the extent that systematic
differences in preferences for committee assignment are correlated with the district
growth potential, correlations between growth and committee membership may be
spurious.
2.3 Indicators of State Political Competition
In addition to the foregoing measures of congressional delegation competition,
we also construct two measures of the degree of political competition in each state,
as proxies for the partisan incentive to channel resources to the state. We then relate
these measures to state economic growth. The first is the absolute value of the
7The set of Influential committees can also vary over time. The House Ways and
Means Committee was probably more powerful before 1974 than after that year's
House reforms, when some of its functions were shifted to the Steering and Policy
Committee.
8Shepsle (1978) and Smith and Deering (1984) find that perceived constituent
interests are the the strongest determinants of committee requests by newly-elected
members of the House. Krehbiel (1990, 1991) presents evidence on the relationship
between the preferences of committee members and other members of the House,
and argues that the ultimate allocation of members to committees does nQ.t lead those
with high-demand Jurisdictions to occupy committee places.15
difterence between the state vote for the Democratic presidential candidate and the
national average vote for that candidate In the last presidential election.9 A state
with a vote outcome that precisely equalled the national vote would be highly
competitive, while one with an extreme vote share for either party would be less
competitive.
Our second measure Is based on House of Representatives vote outcomes. We
define competitive districts as those In which one party received less than 60 percent
of the votes cast. We further subdivide districts by whether Democrats or
Republicans are the majority party. We therefore compute two variables to measure
political competition: the fraction of a state's districts with Democratic vote shares
between 40 and 49 percent, and the fraction with vote shares between 50 and 60
percent. The correlation between the 50-60 percent variable and our measure of
political competition based on presidential vote shares, -.17, is actually quite low,
suggesting that these two variables capture distinct aspects of political competition.
3. Political Influences on State Growth Rates
We relate per capita personal income growth in state I in year t (In y) to a set
of state and time effects as well as variables for congressional delegation seniority
(which we refer to generically as SENIORITY), congressional committee influence
(COMMITTEE), and state political competition (COMPETITION). Our basic estimating
9Due to uncertainty over how to classify the Wallace vote in the 1968 election,
we omit the years 1969-1972 from all regressions Including our political
competitiveness variables.16
equation is:
(3.1) In y = 6 + i7 + fin y,.1 + ! a1*SENIORlTY
+ , yCOMMITTEE + O1COMPETlTlON1 + e.
We estimate this model with and without state effects (6J, but always include year
effects (qj to capture aggregate changes over time in national economic growth. This
specification assumes that a senior congressman, or a representative on a given
committee, can deliver an increment to his district's growth rate in each year.1°
Our rationale for including state fixed effects is to capture unobserved factors
that differ across states but may affect observed economic growth. In many
equations we also include the lagged value of state per capita income, following the
recent "convergence" literature such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). This literature
models economic growth as a function of initial conditions, such as state education
levels and natural resource endowments, which are subsumed in our state fixed
effects.
The year-to-year variability of real income growth differs dramatically across
states as a result of differences in industrial composition and other factors. For
example, the variance of North Dakota's annual growth rate is more than twenty-five
times greater than that of New York. Our estimation procedure therefore allows for
'°An example can illustrate this. Consider a one-representative state, with Its lone
representative in the most senior group of Democrats. Then DEM 1-20 will equal 1 .0,
and the effect on state per capita income growth will be o. If a state has ten
representatives, and one is in the most senior group, his effect on state per capita
income growth will be a1/10. The value of DEM1-20 for a state with one such
representative would be .10, which still satisfies the relationship d(ln y)/d(DEM1 -20)
= 01.17
heteroscedasticity In e of the form V(E.) = a12. We estimate this model using a
feasible generalized least squares procedure. All of our analysis focuses on the 48
continental states.
3.1 Full SamDle Results
We begin our empirical analysis by studying the relationship between economic
growth and our nonparametric seniority variables, and then introduce measures of
committee membership and state political competition to the estimating equation.
Table 3.1 reports estimates of equation (3.1) constraining= = 0 for all j, but
Including all of the seniority variables for both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. The table presents three specifications. The first excludes the lagged state
income term. The second includes this variable, and the third includes this variable
as well as state effects that allow average per capita income growth rates to differ
across states.
The coefficient estimates in the first column of Table 3.1 confirm the visual
evidence of Figure 2.3: states with a higher share of very senior Democratic
congressmen grow faster than other states. The difference between the growth rate
of a state with Qni top 20 Democrats in its delegation, and a state with a House
delegation that is comprised entirely of Republicans with seniority below 140, is 2.4%
per year.11 Shifting one representative in a delegation of ten from the junior
11Republican representatives with seniority below 140 are the excluded group"
in our set of seniority variables for the House.18
Republican to the senior Democrat group, slightly more than a one standard deviation
change in the "Democrats 1-20" variable, would be correlated with a one quarter of
one percentage point increase in the state growth rate. The estimated effect of
representation by senior Democrats is attenuated when we include lagged state
income in the growth rate specification, as in the second column of Table 3.1, but it
remains statistically significant.12
One obvious objection to these findings is that they are solely attributable to
a "South effect." During our sample period, Southern states were on average
represented by more senior delegations in Congress, and these states grew faster than
the nation as a whole. Adding state fixed effects to the specification, as in the third
column of Table 3.1, clearly rejects this explanation of our findings. By allowing
separate intercept terms for each state, we control for the possibility that some states
have faster-than-average growth rates during this period. The coefficients on the
seniority variables are now identified only from within state, over time variation in
state growth and congressional delegation seniority.9
Figure 3.1 plots the estimated coefficients on the seniority variables from the
model in the third column In Table 3.1, along with their one standard error bands.
'2We could not reject the null hypothesis of serial indepedence of the errors in
models with lagged state per capita Income.
'The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the state fixed effects are zero is
rejected at standard confidence levels. We have also estimated Model 3 excluding the
Southern states. The estimated coefficients on the seniority variables are slightly
larger, and differ from zero at higher levels of statistical confidence, than those for the
entire sample.19
These estimates, and those from the other models, suggest that states represented
by very senior Democrats have the highest growth rates. Through the middle ranks
of seniority for Democrats, growth declines steadily. The most junior Democrats,
however, fare better than some of their more senior colleagues. Since states
represented by junior Democrats are likely to be more politically competitive than
jurisdictions with more senior Democratic representatives, this pattern provides some
support for the role of parties In Congress in distributing economic benefitstoward
marginal districts. We explore this question further below.
There is no evidence that states with senior, or junior, Republican
'.5














.vtO ,r,u rt.d v1t14 —.'r. .20
representatives grow faster than other states. An F-test for the joint statistical
significance of all of the coefficients for Republican representatives does notallow us
to reject the null hypothesis that all of these coefficients are zero. Similarly, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the Senate seniority
variables are jointly zero.
The estimates in Table 3.1 suggest that lagged per capita income is an
Important predictor of state growth rates. Including lagged income does not affect
the estimated pattern or statistical significance of the coefficients on the seniority
variables, however. Inclusion of state fixed effects does significantly affect the
coefficient on the lagged income term, increasing the apparent rate of convergence.
We have also explored the correlation between growth rates and lagged as well
as contemporaneous seniority. We find some evidence that the greatest effect of
seniority on growth occurs when a congressman first becomes senior, and that a state
that but is no longer, represented by a senior delegation may grow slower than
the average state. The net effect of a senior delegation, adding together both current
and future growth rate effects, is nevertheless similar to that in our reported equations
that focus only on contemporaneous seniority.
In light of our finding that Senate seniority in either party, and House
Republican seniority, do not have any substantial explanatory power for state growth,
we exclude these variables from all subsequent equations that we estimate. Since our
results suggest that the most important effects of Democratic House seniority are
concentrated among the very senior and very junior representatives, we retain only21
these variables when we expand our specification to allow for committee and partisan
competition effects. We have, however, estimated our expanded models with a full
set of seniority variables; none of the reported coefficients are substantially affected.
To test the hypothesis that membership on key congressional committees
affects state growth, we include the COMMITTEE variables as well as the reduced set
of SENIORITY variables in regression equations for state per capita income growth.
This equation, which is reported in the first column of Table 3.2, provides mixed
evidence of committee effects. The null hypothesis that all committee variables have
zero coefficients can be rejected at the .10, but not the .05, confidence level. Public
Works is the only committee membership that exhibits a strong positive correlation
with economic growth. The estimated coefficient, .011, implies that if we compare
two otherwise identical states with ten members of the House, one with one member
on Public Works, the other with two, the latter state would be predicted to grow
0.1% faster each year. This finding is consistent with Ferejohn's (1974) result that
there is some geographical bias in public infrastructure spending toward the districts
of Public Works committee members, although it could also be the result of self-
selection onto the committee by representatives from districts with high expected
growth and hence high Infrastructure spending needs.
The equation in the second column of Table 3.2 includes the reduced set of
SENIORITY variables as well as the two variables that measure a state's political
competitiveness on the basis of its share of single-part House seats. These two
varIables, particularly the fraction of House seats that were won by a Democrat with22
between 50 and 59% of the vote, are correlated with state growth rates. For a state
with ten congressional districts, the estimates imply that a switch of one seat from
being a safe Democratic or Republican seat to being a marginal Democratic seat is
correlated with a 0.06% per year Increase In the state's growth rate. Because the
fraction of marginal Democratic districts varies substantially across states, with a
standard deviation of 0.244, the estimated competitiveness effect can explain
substantial differences in growth rates across states. The point estimates suggest a
larger positive growth effect in wpoliticaliy marginaiR districts that are controlled by
Democrats than in those controlled by Republicans.
The third column of Table 3.2 reports estimates of an equation that includes our
alternative measure of state political competitiveness based on the Democratic share
of the votes in the last presidential election.'0This variable also exhibits a
statistically significant coefficient In the state growth equation. The estimated
coefficient, -0.24, indIcates that each five percentage points by which the Democratic
candidate's vote share in the state deviates from the national average, roughly a one
standard deviation change in this variable, is correlated with a decline of 0.01 % per
year In the state's growth rate.
Finally, the last column of Table 3.2 shows the effect of including the limited
set of SENIORITY variables, the COMMITTEE variables, as well as both sets of
COMPETITION variables In a single equation. The estimated coefficients are very
'°ThIs variable restricts the effect of deviations from the national average vote for
president to be the same regardless of whether a state's vote is skewed toward
Democrats or Republicans. We could not reject this assumption.23
similar to those in the earlier equations that focus on only subsets of these variables.
Including the COMPETITION and COMMITTEE variables has very little effect on the
estimated effect of very senior House Democrats. As partisan models of
congressional distributive politics predict, these variables do attenuate the estimated
effect of low seniority Democratic congressmen on state growth. The coefficient on
the DEM181 + variable, which is estimated at .008 (.002) in a model with
COMMITTEE but without COMPETITION variables, delines to .005 (.003) when the
COMPETITION variables are included. Including both sets of political competitiveness
variables weakens, but does not eliminate, the effect of the presidential vote variable.
The coefficients on the competition variables defined on the basis of congressional
district votes are virtually unaffected by including the presidential vote variable.
One potential difficulty with our focus on per capita income is that it may
understate the effect of representatives who generate economic activity in their
districts, because such activity may attract immigrants. This could lead to smaller
estimated effects on per capita income than total income. To address this potential
problem, we estimated, but do not report, the models in Table 3.2 with total rather
than per capita income as the dependent variable. The estimated effect of senior
Democratic representatives is substantially smaller in this specification, suggesting
that these models differ by more than the simple migration effect described above.
The coeffients on the Agriculture, Armed Services, and Public Works committee chairs
are substantially larger, and statistically significant, in this model. The political
competition variables based on House votes are very similar to those in Table 3.2,24
while the COMPETITION variable based on presidential votes has a coefficient that is
statistically insignificantly different from zero.
3.2 SubsamDle Resulti
The regression models reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 assume a stable
relationship between economic growth and seniority, committee membership, and
political competition over a period of nearly four decades. Yet there have been many
important changes over that time period that could alter the link between
congressional representation and growth. In contrast to the relative balance between
the parties early in our sample, the Democratic party has enjoyed comfortable
majorities in the House for most of the last two decades. In addition, civil rights, a
divisive issue within the Democratic party, became less important in the latter half of
our sample. Both of those factors point to an increased concentration of power in the
hands of Democrats vis-a-vls Republicans. Also, as Reiselbach (1986) describes, the
congressional reforms of the early 1970s reduced the importance of committee chairs,
increased the influence of junior members, and shifted power toward members of the
Steering and Policy Committee. Finally, the increase in the federal government's
Impact on the economy during the last four decades has expanded the potential for
political factors to aftect economic growth.
Table 3.3 tests for the sub-sample stability of the equations described earlier,
dividing the sample in 1974. In addition to the political changes highlighted above,
this date roughly coincides with the first OPEC oil shock, which slowed the rate of25
economic growth throughout the United States. In our sub-sample analysis we allow
the coefficients on all of the political variables to differ between the first and second
sample periods, but we constrain the coefficient on the lagged income variable, and
the state effect coefficients, to be equal in the two periods.
The results in Table 3.3 suggest that states represented by senior Democratic
delegations enjoyed the faster-than-average economic growth in both sample periods,
but especially in the period since 1974. This result is consistent with increased
Democratic control of the House and growth in the scope of government, but
surprising in light of the congressional reforms." With respect to committee
membership, there are several changes across sub-samples. Membership on the
House Agriculture Committee was more strongly correlated with state growth in the
early than in the later part of the sample period, and the value of members on the
House Public Works and Armed Services Committees was larger for the post-i 974
than earlier period. The coefficients on the political competitiveness variables are
relatively stable across sample periods.
3.3 The Switch in House Party Control. 1953-4
Since 1954, the Democratic Party has been the majority party in the House of
Representatives. Our variables for senior congressmen from the majority party
"One potentially important shift between the first and second parts of our sample
is a change in the composition of senior Democratic House members. The share of
such members who represent urban areas in the North increased substantially during
the sample period, and this could contribute to differences In their estimated growth
effects across the two subsamples.26
therefore are highly correlated with variables measuring strong Democratic party
support. This is a potential problem if there are attributes of Democratic strongholds
that also make them high-growth regions. Political events of the early 1 950s provide
a limited opportunity to investigate this problem. The Democrats were the majority
party in the 82nd Congress, elected in 1950, but the Republicans won control of the
House in the 1952 election. The Democrats regained control of the House in the
1954 election.
To investigate the effect of this change in party control on the relationship
between seniority and economic growth, we created an indicator variable for 1953
and 1954 and added the interaction between this variable and "Democrats 1 -20" and
"Republicans 1-20" to equations like those in Table 3.1, column three. The
interaction term for "Democrats 1-20" is -.051 (.036), while that for "Republicans 1-
20" Is .037 (.031). On average, states represented by delegations with many senior
Republicans experienced much faster growth during the 1953-4 period than during the
rest of the sample period, while states with senior Democrats grew quite slowly when
the Republicans controlled the House. While the standard error on the estimated
coefficient is too large to support a definitive conclusion, the results suggest a link
between seniority, partisan control, and economic growth.
4. QuantifyIng the Links Between PolitIcal Factors and Economic Growth
The results in the last section suggest several statistically significant relations
between state political variables and economic growth rates. To illustrate the27
substantive Importance of the various political factors, in this section we consider
several "what if" scenarios and compare actual state growth rates to our forecasts of
growth rates if all states exhibited average political characteristics. Our calculations
are based on the regression model in the fourth column of Table 3.2.
First, we consider the effect of congressional seniority on state economic
growth. We set the values of DEM1-20, DEM21-60, and DEM181 + to their sample
average values, and then, for each state, compute the difference between the actual
and predicted average growth rate. The first column of Table 4.1 presents the actual
average state growth rates over the 1953-1990 period, and the second column shows
the component of this growth that we attribute to deviations from average
congressional seniority.12
The effect of congressional seniority on economic growth is estimated to be
less than 0.1% per year In all but five states. The states that appear to have
benefitted the most from the House seniority system are Mississippi, with an increase
in the state growth rate of 0.30% per year relative to an average growth rate of
2.82%, Texas (0.18% per year, relative to a 2.08% average), and Arkansas (0.18%
peryear, relative to 2.81% average). The two states that our estimates suggest have
the most as a result of seniority disparities are Vermont and New Hampshire, both
of which are predicted to have grown 0.13% per year j as a result of heavily
12Appendix Table A-i reports the mean values of several of the explanatory
variables In the regression equations shown in Table 3.2. Although we present
estimates of Rpolitical effects" for all states In Table 4.1, for many states, it would not
be possible to reject the hypothesis that all of these effects are zero.28
Republican representation. For most states, however, the estimated effects of
seniority are relatively small.
Our next calculation evaluates the effect of congressional committee
assignments on state growth rates. We set the variables corresponding to
membership on the five key House committees and for committee chairs and ranking
members to their sample averages, and compute the predicted change in state growth
rates. The resulting differences in state growth rates are shown in the third column
of Table 4.1. There are more large estimated effects for the committee variables than
for the seniority variables above. For example, Vermont Is estimated to have grown
0.17% per year faster, and Arkansas 0.20% faster, as a result of having members on
key House committees.13 Vermont's lone representative sat on either the Agriculture
or Armed Services committee for most of the period. Arkansas has had an average
of 9.6 percent of its delegation holding key committee chairmanships, the highest of
any state in the nation.
Finally, we consider the effect of political marginality on economic growth. We
set the values of both the congressional district marginality variables, and our political
competition variable based on presidential election votes, equal to their sample
averages. The resulting predicted changes in state growth rates are reported in the
'Two of the three largest effects of committee assignments on economic growth,
the -0.28% effect for Rhode Island and the -0.23% effect for North Dakota, are
arguably spurious.Our estimates suggest that membership on the House
Appropriations Committee has a negative effect on state growth, and both Rhode
Island and North Dakota, states with small delegations, had a high fraction of their
delegation on this committee during our sample period.29
fourth column of Table 4.1. The substantive importance of the political competition
variables Is much greater than that of the congressional seniority and committee
assignment variables. Single-party states are estimated to have substantially lower
growth rates than more competitive states. For example, our estimates imply that
Alabama would have grown 0.19% per year faster, and Georgia 0.27% and Louisiana
0.16% per year faster, if they exhibited the average degree of inter-party competition.
At the other extreme, states that we classify as highly competitive, such as Colorado,
Connecticut, or Delaware, are estimated to experience large growth gains (0.15%,
0.21%, and 0.25% per year, respectively).
Even small differences in growth rates can compound to generate large
differences in the J1 of state income by the end of our sample. This can be
illustrated with an example. Our estimates imply that Texas would have grown
0.17% per year slower if it had been an average state during our sample period. It
received a growth benefit from its House delegation's high seniority and presence on
key committees, although its below-average competitiveness reduced its growth rate.
Measured in 1990 dollars, per capita income in Texas in 1953 was $5,930; this grew
at 2.08% per year, to $12,802, by 1990. If Texas had not received the growth
benefits that we attribute to political factors, per capita income in 1990 would have
been $780 lower than it actually was. This highlights the importance of compound
growth. Some of the large estimated effects of political variables, particularly those
associated with the competitiveness variables, translate into what may appear to be
implausibly large differences in the level of state per capita income.30
5. Does Politics Affect Growth. or Growth Affect Politics?
The foregoing results suggest an intriguing association between state growth
rates, House delegation seniority and committee membership, and the degree of
political competition in a state. A positive correlation between seniority or
membership on a powerful committee and economic growth is consistent with
nonpartisan distributive politics models in which more powerful legislators enact
policies that benefit their constituents. The correlation between politically competitive
states and growth rates is consistent with partisan distributive politics models. Such
correlations do not uniquely support these models of congressional decision-making,
however. In particular, there are several alternative explanations for our findings that
involve a wreverse causalityw between economic growth and state political variables.
One possibility is that voters in states that experience more rapid economic
growth for any reason are more likely to re-elect their incumbent congressmen,
thereby inducing a positive correlation between growth rates and seniority.'4 There
is ample evidence at the national level, summarized for example in Fair (1988), that
economic growth raises the vote share of the President and his party. There is far
less evidence of a link between economic conditions and congressional election
outcomes. Peltzman (1990) finds that national economic conditions affect votes for
incumbent congressmen, but this effect appears to be mediated largely by party
'4This relationship could result from a higher probability of re-election for
incumbents who stand for re-election, or a higher probability that incumbents will
choose to run for re-election, or both. Fowler, et p1. (1980) present evidence on a
related Issue, the link between committee assignment and re-election prospects.31
membership. When the national economy is strong, members of the President's party
receive an electoral benefit, and vice versa. Erikson (1990) presents similar results,
and surveys the related literature on economic conditions and electoral outcomes.
Chubb (1988) finds little relationship between state election outcomes and state
economic conditions.
Two factors raise questions about this argument as It applies to members of the
House of Representatives. First, the re-election rate in general elections for House
incumbents is extremely high: 94.7 percent over the period 1960-90. Only five
Democratic congressmen in the top 20 seniority group were defeated during this time
period; this corresponds to a re-election success rate of 98.2%. Given these high re-
election rates, economic conditions would have to be one of, if not the, primary
determinant of congressional elections to induce significant changes in the seniority
distribution.
Second, we can test for a link between state economic conditions and the
probability that members of the delegation turn over. We estimated regression
equations relating the turnover rate in a state's House delegation to the growth rate
in per capita state personal income in the election year and the previous year, year
effects, and the percentage of Democrats in the state's congressional delegation.15
We analyze turnover at the state level because data on economic conditions at the
district level are not available at the frequency of House elections.
'5Republican members of the House have historically experienced higher rates of
turnover than their Democratic counterparts. Ansolabehere and Gerber (1993) present
summary statistics on turnover and a model of endogenous turnover.32
The resulting estimates for the perIod 1950-1988, N = 960, are shown below:
TURNOVER = -O.58'ln Yi,t - O.28Aln v1..1 - O.035DEM% A2 = .026
(0.28) (0.25) (0.023)
These results show a statistically significant but substantively small link between
current as well as lagged economic growth and turnover rates. A state that was
average in all respects, except that economic growth had lagged the nation by two
percent in both the current and past year, would have a predicted turnover rate of
20.1%, compared with a national average of 18.4%.16
To interpret this change in turnover rates, we consider the probability that a
newly elected congressman will remain in office for twenty-four years, roughly the
tenure required to become one of the twenty most senior Democratic House members.
The twenty-four year survival rate for newly elected representatives, assuming
average economic conditions in their state, is 8.7%. if state economic growth lagged
the nation by two percent in each of those twenty-four years, the turnover model
implies that the twenty-four year survival rate would change by approximately two
percentage points, to 6.8%.h7 The compound effect of twenty-four years of growth
leThese results are consistent with recent evidence on Senate elections.
Chressanthis and Shaffer (1993) and Bennett and Wiseman (1991) analyze the effect
of state economic performance, as measured by the growth in personal income or the
unemployment rate, on the vote share of incumbent Senators, and they find very
weak effects.
'7We estimate the twenty-four year survival rate as the twelve-fold product of one
minus the biennial turnover probability implied by the regression models in Table 4.1,
column four.33
at the national average minus two percent would be a 40% decline in the size of the
state's economy as a share of the nation. Since even even this dramatic change in
economic performance would have a relatively small effect on long-term re-election
rates, we are not persuaded by the "reverse causality" explanation for the correlations
described above.
Another possible interpretation of our findings is that states with more senior
congressmen are more homogeneous than states with more junior delegations.At the
district level, a solid majority for a single party is a prerequisite for continued re-
election of the same congressman, and hence for seniority. If homogeneity is good
for growth, a spurious correlation between seniority and growth could arise.
There are three reasons to doubt this explanation for our results. First, if
homogeneity per se was the source of growth, then the coefficient on senior
Republicans should also be significantly positive, yet we find no evidence for this.
Second, our estimates that allow for state fixed effects in the rate of economic
growth should largely capture factors such as homogeneity. Even after allowing for
state effects, however, we find important differences in the growth rates of states
when they are represented by senior delegations and when they are not. Finally, this
explanation is in direct conflict with our finding that states with extreme valuesof
either Democratic or Republican votes for presidential candidates, or unusually high
shares of safe districts, grow more slowly than politically competitive states.
Even if reverse causality does not explain our findings with regard to
congressional seniority, it is still possible that it could affect our results on the returns34
to political competition. Economic growth may affect the political complexionof a
Jurisdiction, particularly the degree of competition between political parties.For
example, districts and states that have been historic Democratic strongholds may
experience an increase in their share of Republican voters if they undergo rapid
economic growth. However, if the political marginality variables are simply picking
up an increase In Republicans, then there wouldbe no reason for the coefficient on
Democrat controlled marginal seats to be greater than that of Republican controlled
marginal seats. We have also explored this possibility by examining whether an
increase in marginal Democratic seats that results from a decline In safe Democratic
seats has differential growth effects from an increase as a result of fewer Republican
seats. We found no systematic differences.
6. Seniority. Political Competition. and the Allocation of Federal Spending
Our discussion so far has focused on the outcome of political distribution of
government benefits, economic growth, rather than the precise mechanism through
which this distribution takes place. Potential mechanisms include the redistribution
of federal spending, variation in the allocation of tax burdens, and changes in the
structure of regulation or other federal policies that benefit some locations more than
others. This section explores the first such mechanism, the hypothesis that the
distribution of federal outlays Is affected by the variables that are suggested by the
partisan and nonpartisan models of congressional distributive politics. This is the
question that many previous empirical studies of distributive politics have considered.35
Arnold (1987) argues that different categories of federal spending are subject
to different degrees of geographic control by politicians. At one extreme, federal
payments to individuals and the transfer-related component of intergovernmental
grants are determined by benefit formulae and the characteristics of a state's
population such as the number of elderly or poor individuals. While legislators from
districts that will receive substantial benefits from particular programs may be more
likely to support these programs, it is extremely difficult to alter the geographical
distribution of spending once the terms of the program have been set. At the other
extreme, spending on military wages and some public works projects may be easily
re-allocated across districts.
In fiscal year 1990, 50.8% of federal spending was direct payments to
individuals.'8 This includes Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, retirement
benefits for federal employees, and a variety of other programs. The other
components of total federal spending include procurement contracts (1 7.1 %), salaries
and wages for federal employees (14.9%), and intergovernmental grants (13.5%).
Forty-two percent of the latter category consists of grants for AFDC and Medicaid.
Data on the state-by-state allocation of various components of federal spending
are available for different sample periods. For direct payments to individuals, federal
wages and salaries, and intergovernmental grants, we have data for the 1958-1990
period. Overall procurement spending data is only available beginning in 1982, so we
• 'These data are drawn from the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations
(1992). Average per capita federal expenditures were $3902 in FY1990.36
Instead use Department of Defense prime contract awards, which account for
approximately 75 percent of overall procurement, and for which data are available
since 1959. We also consider total federal outlays, but data for this aggregate are
only available for the 1970-1990 period, with data missing in 1971 and 1977.
We estimate spending equations in which the dependent variable is either total
federal spending per capita, or spending in a particular category of outlays, and the
independent variables are the same as those in the economic growth equations
estimated above. To capture differences across districts and states in their
fundamental suitability for certain types of federal funds, we include state fixed-
effects In our analysis.
Table 6.1 presents estimates of regression equations relating political variables
to the level of federal spending, measured in 1990 dollars. The results are mixed. For
total federal outlays (column 1), the indicator variables for senior Democratic
congressmen enter positively, but the estimated coefficients are not statistically
significant.'9 The point estimates for individual spending categories over longer time
periods show both positive and negative effects, but the null hypothesis of zero effect
Is rarely rejected. Similarly, the coefficients on committee membership and committee
rank do not exhibit any clear pattern. The variables measuring political competition
based on congressional vote percentages do not suggest higher spending in more
competitive states, while the analogous variable based on presidential vote share does
"Atlas et at. (1993) present evidence that some political variables, notably a
state's degree of over-representation in Congress relative to population, are correlated
with the distribution of federal taxes and outlays.37
suggest such an effect. For total spending and several spending categories, this
effect is statistically significant.
The equations reported in Table 6.1 focus on the contemporaneous relationship
between political factors and state economic growth. We also considered the
possibility that pI political variables could affect current spending. There are often
lags between authorizations, appropriations and expenditures. Moreover, if a previous
congressman had secured a military base for a district, then current spending could
be high, even if that congressman no longer represented the district. When we added
lagged political variables to our spending equations, however, we did not find any
systematic patterns.20
These results are difficult to reconcile with our earlier findings on growth rates
fortworeasons. First, there are no strong relationships between the political variables
that are correlated with growth rates, and the level of per capita federal spending.
This raises a question about the source of the link between political factors and
economic growth. Second, even when the estimated coefficients in the spending
equations are consistent with the growth effects in the last section, the magnitudes
of the spending effects do not appear large enough to generate these growth effects.
For example, using the estimates for total spending in the first column of Table 6.1,
20We also estimated equations relating changes in spending to various political
indicators, again recognizing the possibility that current representatives might be
unable to affect the history-based level of spending, but could affect increments to
it. The empirical findings from the spending change equations were even less
conclusive than those for spending levels; virtually none of the political variables were
statistically significant at standard significance levels.38
if ten percent of a state's House delegation consists of senior Democrats, rather than
Republicans, the state is predicted to receive an extra $12 per capita in federal
spending. If each dollar of federal outlays directed to a state generates an additional
dollar of private income, then such a delegation shift would result in state income
growth of $24 per capita. Since average per capita personal income was about
$14,500 in 1990, this implies a spending-related Increment to the leyei of state
income of approximately 0.2%. That one-time change In the level of state income is
far below the values Implied by the coefficients in our growth equations.
This disparity between the estimated spending effects and the estimated
growth effects leaves the channel through which political factors affect economic
activity unresolved.It is possible that congressmen can influence economic
conditions in their districts in many ways besides the direct allocation of federal
spending, for example through regulations enacted or avoided, trade policies, or tax
rules. Unfortunately, we are unaware of any quantitative measures of the impact of
these policies on states or congressional districts, and have therefore been unable to
construct empirical tests for these channels of influence.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents empirical evidence on the predictive power of several
theories of congressional decision-making on the distribution of economic activity.
We test nonpartisan distributive politics models, which focus on the role of influential
legislators, measured either by seniority or committee membership, on the benefits39
received by their jurisdiction. We also develop tests of partisan distributive politics
models that emphasize the role of congressional parties, and find some support for the
view that economic rewards are channelled to highly competitive jurisdictions that are
currently represented by the majority party in Congress.
One natural extension of this work involves developing more specific tests for
the basis of congressional influence. We have not tried, for example, to distinguish
between models of committee influence based on information asymmetries and other
alternative explanations of the basis of the influence of senior members and those on
key committees.
A second direction for extension concerns the link between congressional
institutions and the overall level of economic growth. We have focused on the link
between congressional representation and the distribution of economic growth, but
there may also be important interactions between congressional structure and the
likelihood of enacting legislation with favorable effects on overall economic growth.
Finally, we have not been able to trace the source of the growth-seniority
relationship to a clearly identifiable action under congressional control. In particular,
we find much weaker relationships between spending and seniority than between
growth and seniority; this raises the question of whether our findings on the
correlation between growth and political factors are the result of correlation with other
omitted variables. Searching for such omitted factors, especially omitted correlates
of state political competitiveness, is a natural direction for future work.40
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T4.3.1:Congr.uuion.l Ssnioilty & St.t. Econorec Growth. 1953-1990
E,cp1ory V.r(abI. (with St.ndw'd Divt.t)on) Model 1 Model 2 Model3
D.mocrsts 1-20 0.025 0.018 0.013
(0.084) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0081
Osmocrsta 21-60 0.016 0.013 0.002
(0.135) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Osmocrete 61-100 0.005 0.005 -0.005
(0.134) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Osmoorstu 101.140 0.007 0.007 -0.001
(0.130) (0.004) (0.004) (.006)
0.moa.ts 141-180 0.004 0.004 0.000
(0,150) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
D.mocr.te 181+ 0.010 0.010 0.007
(0.189) (0.004) (0.004) 40.004)
Republlc.u 1-20 0.006 0.007 0.001
(0.084) (0.006) (0.006) 40.008)
Repubkcaie 21-60 0.005 0.005 -0.002
(0.158) 40.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Rsixibcans 61-100 0.003 0.003 -0007
(0.166) 40.004) (0.004) 40,004)
Republiceris 101-140 0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.200) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Osmocrsts 1-10 0.000 -0002 -0.002
40.232) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
0.mocrsts 11-20 -0.002 -0.004 .0.005
(0.219) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
D.moaata 21-30 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.212) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.mocrsts3l+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.3121 (0.002) 40.002) (0.002)
Rspublc.ns 1-10 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.221) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Repubcans 11-20 -0.002 .0.002 -0.001
(0.226) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R.pubkane 21-30 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000
(0.227) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
— 0.017 '0.069
(0.003) (0.009)
Stste Etf.cts7 No No Yes
F-Test:House Democrete <.01 <.05 <.05
F-Test: House Republicans >65 > .50 > .45
F-Test: S.net. >95 >95 > .70
0.572 0.585 0.576
Notes:E,tlmsteeen b.sed on data for 48 states, 1953-1990, N - 1824. A1.pecfllcatlone Indud. exhaustive yew effects (sonoconstant
tenni and weestimatedby a I easle GIS proc.duss desalb.d ki th. text. Stenderd errors we shown in pwsnthesas. The ,t.ndwd diviation
I th. r'wag. of the ennuel standwd deviations for the seniority vedablsa. F-test veluss we significance bounds.44
T.bl.3.2:CongcsssIoflS.n(oilty. Conwv*tses. and Stat.Econcn,cGrowth
panatory van.4e MOd.)1 Modal2 MOd.) 3 MOdal4
(St.nddD.viatlon)
Houss Seniority
Democrats 1.20 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.012
(0.084) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Democrat.21-60 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.135) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
D.mocrats181+ 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.005

















Hotat. Vote50-59% 0.000 0.007
Democrat 10244) (0.003) (0.003)
House Vote 40-49% 0.004 0.003
Demoa-st(0.256) (0.002) (0.003)
PrsuVot.-NsdAvg -0.024 -0.020
(SDemocrat)(0.053) (0.012) (0.01 2)
In y, -0.078 -0.080 .0.078 -0.084
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
F-list:Seniority <.01 <.05 <.01 <.20
F-Test:Connitte.e <.10 ... ... <.10
F-test: Comp.titiv.n.se ... <.05 <.05 <.05
F-test:Al Political V.r,.bioe <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
A' 0.610 0.808 0.808 0.614
Notes: Dependentvedsbls Is snnuai p.rc.nt theng. In state p.r cepita personal income. Estimates are bes.d on data for 48states 1953-
1990. excluding1989-1872(du. toWallace presIdential can.gn) when the presidential political campetidvsne.s I included in rsgr.s.icrie.
All specIficatIonsinclude.xhauetlveyear endstatesff.cts sono constent tsrm) and era astlmatsd by a feasibli 01$ procedure described in
thetext.9tendarderrorsars uhown In per-.nthesee. The standard d.vletlon Istheaverage of the annual standard deviations for the seniority
vtthl.s.Chair and ranking men*lr varisbie reflect chairs end ranking memnb.ms of only the five ccnvnitteee Included in the regression. F-test
value is thesignificance bound.45
TabI.3.3: Congr.s.Iond S.n4os$ty. Conviitt.... and Stat. Ecanoiric Growth: Sub-Samp). Stability
EatoryVarl.bI. 19531973 1974-1990
Mcii,.San(or$ty
D.inocr.ts 1-20 0.003 0.022
(0.011) (0.010)
D.moaM. 21-00 0.004 0.001
(0.000) (0.008)









Public Wodis 0.005 0.015
(0.006) (0.006)




Ranking Marubar 0.018 0.009
(0.027) (0.024)
Pglitlcd Coneatltivan.ss
Hous. Vol. 50-09% 0.007 0.009
D.mocrst (0.003) (0.005)










Al Polit3c Variablus <.10
Not..: 0.p.nd.nt v.labI. Is annu parcint thong. k stat, par cita p.r.onl kcom.. E.tlm.ta. .5 b.s.d on data for 48 stat... .xcluding
I 969-1972(dusto Wajiac. pr.sIdi canógn) wh.n th. prssld.n political con.titiv.nass Is includ.d in rsgrassions. Spocification
Inckad.. sxhuu.tivi ysar and stats .ff.c (so no constant t.nn) and I. sstimat.d by a I s.sl. GLS pi-oc.dis. dsscrib.d in th.t.xt.Stat. fixsd-
.ff.cts .. ccnsain.d to b. constant sore.. th. two dms pirlod.. Standard arror, .-.shownin p..nth.s.s. Chair and ranking manth.
varlabl. r.liact chair, andranking,n.nth.rs ol only thu Rv. ocntts.s lnc(ud.d in th. r.grsssion. F-t.st valus is th. significanc. boisid.46
Tsb.4.1:Thih.ct ofPo8dc.I Vanebss on Growth Across States
Av,r kct Of I?.Ot Of Iyact of bitct Of
$.nloc$ty Cenyrètt..s Msr,naIitv AJ Politics
AJeisasna 2.59% 0.01% 0.10% -0.19% -0.07%
M.zon. 1.81 -0.03 -0.13 -0.00 -o.ie
Masses 2.81 0.18 0.20 -0.16 0.22
CalIfornia 1.76 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Colorado 1.93 -0.06 -0.04 0.15 0.04
Conn.cdcut 2.16 -0.01 -0.11 0.21 0.09
D.iaww. 1.51 -0.02 -0.10 0.25 0.13
FlorId. 2.53 0.04 .0.02 .0.07 .0.05
G.orgla 2.68 0.07 0.14 -0.27 -0.06
Idaho 1.74 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.02
minoia 1.80 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06
kdlen. 1.74 -0.02 -0.05 0.15 0.08
Iowa 1.97 -0.02 -0.00 0.10 0.08
Kensas 1.88 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.16
Kentucky 2.37 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.08
LoulsIens 2.17 0.09 0.07 -0.16 -0.01
Main. 2.38 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.02
Masytand 2.25 .0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10
M.a..&usstt. 2.37 0.07 -0.07 .0.14 -0.14
MIolgan 1.68 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.09
P4nn.eota 2.29 -0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01
_______ 2.82 0.30 0.09 -0.31 0.08
MissourI 2.00 0,01 0.14 0.09 0.24
Montana 1.42 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Ns.ka 1.94 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.31
Nevada 1.27 0.01 -0.17 0.04 -0.12
N.wHan,p.hlr. 2.62 -0.13 0.10 -0.01 -0.04
N.wjsrs.y 2.27 .0.04 -0.00 0.06 0.02
N.wMsslco 1.97 .0.01 -0.08 0.19 0.10
Nsw Voit 2.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
North CwoUna 2.89 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.16
North Dakot. 2.45 -0.06 -0.23 -0.03 .0.32
OhIo 1.60 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 .0.06
Oklahcm 2.14 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.03
Orsgan 1.63 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.03
PsnnuIvanhs 2.00 .0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01
iod. island 1.98 0.08 -0.28 -0.06 -0.26
South CerolIn. 2.56 0.08 0.16 -0.14 0.10
South Dakota 2.44 -0.00 0.03 0.10 0.13
Tsnn.ss.. 2.73 0.00 0.11 -0.09 0.02
Taxes 2.08 0.18 0.04 -0.05 0.17
Utah L62 -0.03 -0.15 0.03 -0.15
V.r,nont 2.68 -0.13 0.17 -0.11 -0.06
VIrginia 2.64 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03
WashIngton 1.81 -0.06 -0.06 0.10 -0.02
Wait Virginia 2.09 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.16
WIsconsin 1.85 000 0,03 0.00 0.03
Wyondnq 1.62 -0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.10
Not..:Growth rat,Is the v-.gs stats growth rat. In t.al p., clta p.rsonal Income over the period 1953-1990. Tha in.ct of the political
vaithlos is corngut.d by coirçaing the pr.thctsd growth rat.. given the actual valu of the polItical vwiables in 4u.etlcn to a .cananc where
states —e eselgn.d the snpl. svsrags of the vasuabl.e In qu.atlon. AU computations ass baud on the coefficiant estimates in th. last
oolunvi of labia 3.3.47
Tab).6.1:The Influ.nc.ofPolitical Vanabl.eon State-Sp.cific Fed.r.l Spending
Total Transfer, Fad Wages Grant. DOD Contract.
Explanatory Variable (1970-90) (1959-90) (1958-90) (1959-90) (1959-90)
lou.. Seniority
Democrat.1-20 92 61 -55 13 -49
(111) (29) (18) (16) (49)
Democrat. 21-60 89 .29 21 -17 -7
(87) (19) (12) (11) (31)
D.mocratsl8l+ 05 17 15 3 4
(43) (11) (7) (7) (20)
HouseCommittees
AgrIculture -11 -05 4.0 16 -62
(68) (16) (10) (9) (28)
170 -27 48 6 -2
(72) (16) (10) (9) (23)
ArmedServIces 49 41 -4 7 46
(82) (17) (12) (11) (33)
Pub6c Work. 185 8 66 -3 -26
(71) (19) (11) (10) (29)
Ways & Means 203 -38 31 51 .139
(88) (21) (15) (13) (39)
Chairman 93 77 44 68 -111
(171) (50) (30) (27) (85)
RankIng Member -274 104 10 12 -38
(206) (59) (38) (33) (107)
PolItical Como.tit(v.ness
Hous.VotsSO-59% -12 6 5 -10 -12
Democrat (47) (10) (7) (6) (18)
Haus.Vot.40-49% -69 11 11 -11 -25
Democrat (39) (9) (6) (6) (17)
Pr.sVot.-N.dAvgi -772 -299 -28 -90 -14
(S Democrat) (238) (47) (28) (26) (80)
9 346 178 -101 290
(168) (37) (23) (21) (57)
F-Test:SeniorIty >35 <.01 <.01 <.20 >75
F-Test:Committees <.05 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01
F-teat: Comp.titlvsnss. <01 <.01 <.20 <.01 >50
F-test:MPolitIcalV.nables <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.05
0.885 0988 0.953 0.910 0.728
Notes:Dependent variableIsannual percent change In statepercepitapersonalwicome Estimates arebasedondatafor48 states,excluding
1969-1972 (du. to Wallece presidential can'algn). ti specifications unclud. exhaustive year and stats effect. (so no constantterwil arid we
estimated byafeedble GLS procedure described Inthe text. Standard errorsare shown inparentheses. Chairend rankingmen-bar variable
reflectchair. and rankingmember,of only the five connit1.ie included In the regression. F-test value is the signiflcance bound.4
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